

DOCUMENT RESUME

ED 222 913

CS 207 243

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TITLE Cuban Mass Media: Organization, Control and Functions. Journalism Monographs Number Seventy-Eight.
INSTITUTION Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Communication.
PUB DATE Nov 82
NOTE 41p.
AVAILABLE FROM AEJMC Publications Manager, School of Journalism, University of South Carolina, Columbia, SC 29208 (\$5.00).
PUB TYPE Information Analyses (070) -- Collected Works - Serials (022)
EDRS PRICE MF01/PC02 Plus Postage.
DESCRIPTORS *Censorship; Communism; Foreign Countries; Leadership Styles; *Mass Media; *Organizational Communication; Revolution; *Social Systems; Telecommunications
IDENTIFIERS *Cuba; *Media Role

ABSTRACT

The mass media as interdependent parts of a larger social system both control and are controlled by other subsystems. The various combinations of control, in turn, determine the functions the media system will serve. In the 1960's, the Cuban mass media underwent frequent change that reflected the volatility of the revolutionary process. Today, although all mass communication operates under Marxist-Leninist principles, Cuban media are organized in varying fashions. In broadcasting, the organization is highly centralized, while in the other media, it is relatively decentralized. Under this diverse organizational structure, the controls exercised by the revolutionary elite, such as formal censorship and the more frequent cooptation, are the most powerful and obvious in the process, but there are increasing indications that other subsystems, most notably the mass audience, are also exercising control over media content. After the economic disaster of 1970, Cuban President Castro reorganized his government to include a larger and more diverse power structure and more mass participation in public decision making. Reflecting these changes in society, the mass media are now serving an expanded role of feedback control as well as the traditional distribution control. Public criticism of the tactical operations of the government is transmitted vertically, and advocacy of the needs of major sectors of the power structure is carried horizontally by the mass media to the political elite. That allows broadly based sectors of Cuban society to discuss certain issues among themselves and with the leadership without disrupting the progress of the revolution. (HOD)

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NUMBER SEVENTY-EIGHT

JOHN SPICER NICHOLS

Cuban Mass Media:
Organization, Control and Functions

November 1982

Published serially since 1966 by the
Association for Education in Journalism and
Mass Communication. An official publication
of AEJMC.

An AEJMC Publication

JOURNALISM MONOGRAPHS is one of four official publications of the Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Communication: *Journalism Quarterly* (founded in 1924); *Journalism Educator* (founded in 1946) which continues its affiliation with the American Society of Journalism School Administrators; *Journalism Abstracts* (founded in 1963); and *Journalism Monographs* (founded in 1966).

JOURNALISM MONOGRAPHS was supported for its first two years by a gift from the University of Texas, and until 1979 by the American Association of Schools and Departments of Journalism.

All numbers are in print and may be ordered from the Association, singly or in bulk.

Monographs appearing here are regularly abstracted and indexed in *Historical Abstracts*, *America: History and Life* and the *ERIC Clearinghouse on Reading and Communication Skills*.

Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Communication

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Columbia, SC 29208

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POSTMASTER: send address changes to Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Communication, University of South Carolina, College of Journalism, Columbia, SC 29208.

Subscription rates are: USA one year, \$15.00; Foreign one year, \$20.00. Single issues, \$5.00; Air Mail, \$12.00 surcharge.

NO. 78 November 1982 JOURNALISM MONOGRAPHS (ISSN 0022-5525) is published serially by the Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Communication at University of South Carolina, Columbia, SC 29208. Third class postage paid at Columbia, SC. Copyright 1982 by the Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Communication.

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NUMBER SEVENTY-EIGHT • November 1982

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JOHN SPICER NICHOLS

Cuban Mass Media:
Organization, Control and Functions

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Accepted for Publication September 1980

JOHN SPICER NICHOLS is an assistant professor and director of graduate studies in the School of Journalism at The Pennsylvania State University. The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Orville L. Freeman, chairman of Business International Corporation, Professor R. Thomas Berner, Professor Thomas F. Magner, and Professor Robert O. Blanchard of The Pennsylvania State University, and Professor Robert N. Pierce of the University of Florida. This monograph is based on research conducted in Cuba in 1977 and 1979 and was written in 1979. Consequently, certain specifics (although not the general conclusions) of this monograph have been overtaken by recent events.

IN THE EARLY months after Fidel Castro won control of the Cuban government in January, 1959, he appeared night after night before hundreds of thousands in Revolution Plaza in Havana to explain the goals of the Revolution. Millions more followed the proceedings on radio and television.

Castro's introduction brought several minutes of cheers, singing, dancing and chanting of revolutionary slogans. In those marathon speeches, he informed the public of every new development or setback, no matter how insignificant it appeared. He expounded in detail everything from sophisticated monetary policy to artificial insemination of cattle. By most accounts, his people were mesmerized. They frequently interrupted with more singing and dancing and with shouts of "Viva, Fidel!"

Herbert Matthews, former member of the *New York Times* editorial board and chronicler of the Cuban Revolution, described the emotion as. . .

. . . a religious faith which came pouring over the radio waves and through the television screens in the words and presence of Fidel Castro. I coined a phrase at the time: government by television. The Revolution came in a flood of talk, as Fidel exhorted, explained, reasoned with, and aroused Cuba's millions day after day, night after night, four, five, six hours at a time. The world was amused; Cubans listened enthralled.¹

"What is government by television?" asked Jean Ziegler, a prominent Swiss journalist, and then answered: "With his non-stop TV shows Fidel Castro has actually created a new form of government that is just as original and will perhaps prove no less significant in its historic effects than the Greek invention of government by ballot, better known under the name of Democracy."²

"Government by television" is an apt description. Castro and his lieutenants knew that the success of their government depended on their ability to integrate disparate sectors of Cuban society and collectively mobilize them behind goals of the communist Revolution. The mass media became prime tools in this process. And although Castro's public appearances and television addresses are less frequent today, the importance of the media has not diminished but is actually greater because it serves additional functions for the maturing Cuban Revolution.

THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE: MEDIA SYSTEMS

Mass communication is basic to modern social and political activity, yet very little scholarship on the mass communication process in Cuba can be found in the abundance of sociological and political science literature on the country. Political

scientist and noted Cuban scholar Richard R. Fagen called for a "communication approach to the study of politics" by which systems analysis of communication control could be used to compare the variety of political systems in the world. Yet only his work and the work of a few other Cuban scholars have dealt with the function of mass communication in the Cuban Revolution, and then always tangentially and sometimes superficially.³ If studying the Cuban Revolution is important to our understanding of world governments and developing societies, a better understanding of the organization, control and functions of the Cuban mass media is also important.

The theoretical impetus for this paper is the work of the University of Minnesota research group of Tichenor, Donohue and Olien that views mass communication as a process in which messages are encoded for and eventually delivered to mass audiences.⁴ This process occurs within three interdependent subsystems—source, channel and audience—which cut across other subsystems of the environment and transmit information among and between them. And not only do all large social organizations depend to some extent on information use, they also depend on information control.

According to the macro approach of this paper, social control, either latent or manifest, is basic to all communication processes. Each subsystem is capable of exercising numerous and varied forms of control. The nature of these controls and the degree to which they are exercised largely influence the final product of the mass communication process. Further, the mass media as interdependent parts of a total social system share in controlling, and being controlled by, other subsystems. A change in the controls between any two subsystems, in turn, could affect linkages among all other subsystems and the social system as a whole. By the same token, a change in the larger social system can affect the nature and degree of controls exercised in the linkage between subsystems.

The question, therefore, is not whether controls exist. According to this approach, controls always are present in the mass communication process. For example, the absence of government control over the mass media does not mean that there is a total absence of controls. Other sectors of society, such as business, labor, the churches, will fill the void. In many cases, all of these sectors simultaneously exercise varying degrees and types of control over the mass media.

Most students of the media argue that structural controls in the mass communication process are dysfunctional. In fact, some proponents of a Western concept of "free press" argue that the mass media should be entirely uncontrolled and unregulated to guarantee "journalistic autonomy."⁵ In addition to the view that social control is always present in any media system and, therefore, journalistic autonomy is never realistically possible, the present theoretical perspective also holds that controls can be both functional and dysfunctional.⁶

The degree and nature of the controls in the mass communication process determine whether they are functional or dysfunctional. One combination of controls might improve the performance of the channel subsystem and serve the best interests of the larger social system, but another combination of controls might be so repressive that they stifle the creativity of the communicators and breed

alienation in the audience. Further, what may be functional for one subsystem, system level, or total social system might not be functional for others. For example, a certain combination of media controls might be functional for a large industrial superpower but might be dysfunctional for a small, underdeveloped nation.

Therefore, instead of asking whether controls exist or should exist, the principal research questions should be: Which organizations exert what controls; how they are exercised; where in the mass communication process they occur, and what consequences they have for the total social system and for the interdependent subsystems.

The Tichenor, Donohue and Olien research assumes that conflict and social tension are present in all social systems, especially in large, modern and complex social organizations, and that to a considerable extent, the mass media exist to manage this conflict. Conflict control by the mass media can be the "direct dissipation of tension" but also includes "the generation of conflict situations." Thus, in some social organizations, conflict may be disruptive and the mass media tend to reduce the conflict and encourage consensus in the organization. In other social organizations, conflict may prevent stagnation and add vitality to systemic processes, and the mass media tend to create the necessary social tension. In either case, control of the mass communication process is in the interest of system maintenance. Tichenor, Donohue and Olien point out that "maintenance" does not necessarily mean perpetuating the status quo, although that may happen. Rather, the group defines "maintenance" as sustaining a system and whatever dynamic process which it may encompass.⁷ The Cuban Revolution is, of course, an example of a dynamic process.

The mass media serve two different but overlapping maintenance functions for the social system: feedback control and distribution control. Feedback control is the "watchdog" role in which the mass media apply corrective pressure to subsystems that may be out of functional balance in relation to others. The mass media of the United States, according to many analysts, served a feedback-control function during the Watergate period by setting certain standards of conduct in high government office and by reporting volatile information among sectors of government and to the general public.

The other maintenance function is distribution control in which the social system is served by either withholding information or selectively distributing it. The mass media may either avoid or alter tension-laden messages ranging from national security cases to small-town gossip. Other forms of distribution control are the public relations activities of both private and public agencies in which they attempt to manage the news.⁸

Because the mass media reflect the social system in which they operate, the media's function would be expected to change as society grows more complex. Specifically, as a social system becomes more differentiated and greater interdependence among subsystems increases the potential for conflict among those subsystems, the mass media tend to shift from a consensus approach to a conflict approach. In one of their many operational tests of this general systems theory, Tichenor, Donohue and Olien hypothesized that:

The less complex and differentiated the system, the more likely mass media within that system are to confine themselves to the distributive aspect of system maintenance . . . The more differentiated and pluralistic the system, the more likely mass media are to perform a feedback-control as well as a distributive function.⁹

The research group studied newspaper editors in 88 Minnesota communities with varying population sizes to determine the amount of reporting of local government conflict. The researchers argued that the smaller, homogenous communities have "fewer mechanisms for protecting the social order against the total disruption that might result from uncontrolled public dispute." In such cases, the local press would be more likely to organize support for community projects and avoid controversy in the local government.

On the other hand, larger communities are more diversified, have greater specialization in their governments, and have a larger number and variety of interest groups. In these communities, the press serves functions of initiating social action and maintaining political discourse. As a result, the newspapers in the larger, more complex communities would be expected to report more governmental conflict than the newspapers in the smaller towns. The group found considerable support for the proposition.¹⁰

Nevertheless, if this systems model of mass communication is sound, the proposition also should be supported at different systems levels and in different types of systems. The major purpose of this monograph is to test the aforementioned hypothesis on a national system rather than a community system and on a Communist country, i.e., the Republic of Cuba, rather than a capitalist country.

ORGANIZATION AND CONTROL OF THE CUBAN MASS MEDIA

As discussed in the preceding section, the mass media as interdependent parts of a larger social system both control and are controlled by other subsystems. As such, in order to understand the control functions exercised by the mass media, it is also necessary to understand the controls on the mass media. This section will briefly recount past control of the media of revolutionary Cuba, describe the current organization of the Cuban media, and analyze today's control structures.

History of Cuban Revolutionary Mass Media

In 1954, long before the beginning of guerrilla activity in the Sierra Maestra, Fidel Castro wrote to a fellow revolutionary: "Propaganda cannot be abandoned for a single minute, because it is the soul of every struggle. Ours should have its own style and adjust itself to the circumstances." In that brief statement, Castro points out two important elements that have affected the Cuban media since 1959. First, mass communication is not only important to the Revolution, but Castro considers it the very soul of the process. Second, mass communication in a revolution must be flexible, able to adjust to changing circumstances. Accordingly, as the Cuban Revolution zigzagged through several phases during the past two decades, so too has the role of the Cuban media frequently changed.¹¹

Critics of Castro often charge that he ended a free press in Cuba. In reality,

Castro merely substituted a new combination of controls for those that had been exercised by his predecessor, dictator Fulgencio Batista. The Batista government exercised overt censorship or the more subtle control of bribing editors and reporters into submission.¹² The result was a docile media unable or unwilling to criticize the corrupt government and its allies in Cuba and abroad.

For a year or so after Castro's forces took control of the government in 1959, the media had considerable latitude to criticize the revolutionary government. But as the Revolution gathered steam, Castro felt that an adversary press was not functional to the process and, in late 1960, by intimidation, expropriation and economic pressures, he had closed most of the privately owned printed media and gained complete government ownership of the broadcasting media.

In the early 1960s, the Cubans introduced a Marxist-Leninist media system in which criticism of revolutionary goals was increasingly repressed, and Castro laid down his dictum that was to govern the role of the mass media in the new Cuban society: "For those within the Revolution, complete freedom; for those against the Revolution, no freedom." Despite government intervention, the controls were not monolithic, and a considerable amount of debate still could be found in the Cuban media, particularly the printed media. Two groups, one headed by the revolutionary leader Che Guevara and the other by old-line, Soviet-style communists, argued over the future path of the Revolution. Some of the ideological dialogue spilled onto the pages of Havana's two major newspapers, each controlled by one of the contending groups.

By 1966, Cuba entered a phase of mobilization and radicalization of the media under the newly adopted policies of Guevara, the victor in the debate. The revolutionary elite moved to consolidate their direct control over the media, starting by merging the warring newspapers of the preceding years into *Granma*, the single and official voice of the Cuban Communist Party. It was Guevara's strategy that a "new Cuban man" would be forged in an egalitarian society and mobilized behind revolutionary goals. To do this, the mass media would be used to educate the masses and not allowed to deviate from official policy.

The new phase of the Revolution was a disaster: Cuban-Soviet relations were strained, Guevara was killed in Bolivia while trying to transplant his ideology, and the Cuban economy was in chaos. Castro responded by returning to Soviet-style centralization of his government and continuing tight control on all forms of expression until the Revolution was consolidated. That period lasted until about 1975, when Cuba emerged from five years of international isolation, economic hardship and considerable repression. The revived Cuban Revolution was able to boast of numerous social gains in the area of education, housing and health care, greater economic stability, and a new constitution that granted the masses increased participation in the government. Corresponding to these changes, the Cuban media have assumed, since 1975, a new, critical function in which they serve as channels for citizens' complaints about the tactical operation of the government. No criticism of the strategic goals of the Revolution, however, is permitted. This new stage of the Revolution and the new and related function of the press will be discussed in detail below.

Organization of the Cuban Mass Media

Today's Cuban mass media are organized under Marxist-Leninist principles. All means of mass communication are owned and operated by and are in the service of the government and the party. This does not mean, however, that the organization of the Cuban media is highly centralized. Although the broadcasting media are centralized under the supervision of top government officials, the organization of the remaining media is relatively decentralized and the type of supervision varies greatly.

The Cuban government has no information ministry that administers all, most, or even a large share of the nation's mass communication activities. At least a dozen government divisions have some administrative power over the mass media, and virtually every major sector of Cuban society has its own medium to represent its interests in the national forum.¹³ During the 1960s, most of these sectors, regardless of their different functions, had to speak with the unified voice of the few and highly centralized Cuban media. According to a prominent Cuban editor, however, there has been considerable diversification of the print media in recent years because major sectors have gained control of their own media or have upgraded the media they previously controlled.¹⁴ The outcome is a perceptible degree of advocacy for the sectors the media represent.¹⁵

Broadcast Media. Since the early days of the Revolution, Castro has demonstrated a marked preference for communicating with the Cuban masses via the broadcasting media, and as a result, radio and television are the most highly centralized, pervasive and influential media in the nation today. When the Batista government fell in 1959, Cuba had one of the most highly developed broadcasting systems in the Third World. From this foundation, revolutionary leaders were able to expand the facilities so that radio and television signals now blanket the country and, according to broadcasting officials, every Cuban has access to one of the 3.6 million radio receivers or the 700,000 television receivers.¹⁶ The importance of the broadcasting media to the government is reflected in Cuba's current five-year trade plan which places a very high priority on the importation of more transmitting and receiving equipment.¹⁷

The studios for the five major radio networks (Radio Liberacion, Radio Reblede, Radio Progreso, Radio Musical and Radio Reloj) and the two television channels are geographically concentrated in Havana, and their programming is distributed throughout the country by an extensive system of repeaters. A third television channel which was centered in an eastern province and carried regional programming was consolidated into the national networks in 1978, furthering the centralized control of the television medium. Although regional radio studios still exist, the majority of their programming comes from Havana.

All broadcasting media are supervised by the Cuban Institute of Radio and Television (ICRT) which, in turn, is administered directly by one of the vice presidents of the Council of Ministers. Although ICRT does report to the Ministry of Communication on mostly technical matters and coordinates with other governmental agencies, it is significant that the broadcasting institute is supervised by

such a high official, bypassing lower levels of government that supervise much of the other media.

Newspapers. Unlike the broadcast media, the newspaper medium is not centrally administered. Nonetheless, most newspapers are organized in a similar fashion and closely allied to the leadership of the Cuban Communist Party. *Granma*, the highest circulation daily, is the official voice of the party and is organized as a political division of the party's Central Committee, which is one of the most powerful entities in the Cuban leadership.¹⁸ Havana's other daily, *Juventud Rebelde* (Rebellious Youth), is published by the Union of Young Communists, which is technically a mass organization but actually is nothing more than a youth division of the party. The organization and control of the staff, however, differ somewhat from that of *Granma*.¹⁹ The third national newspaper, *Los Trabajadores* (Workers), is published three times per week by the Central Union of Cuban Workers.

Both *Granma* and *Juventud Rebelde* are distributed throughout the nation (the morning paper *Granma* is circulated outside Havana in the afternoons and vice versa for the afternoon *Juventud Rebelde*) and are the most widely read publications, especially among party workers and government bureaucrats. In addition, the party committees of most of the provinces publish daily newspapers which are closely modeled after *Granma*. Although the circulation and influence of these regional papers are limited, they appear to have greater leeway to comment on local affairs than the national dailies have to comment on national issues.

Periodicals. More than 50 magazines and journals are published in Cuba, and each is governed by a specific sector of the Cuban government or by one of the mass organizations. Examples are *Mujeres* (Women), Cuban Federation of Women; *Politica Internacional* (International Politics), Ministry of Foreign Relations; *Cuba Azucar* (Cuba Sugar), Ministry of the Sugar Industry; and *El Deporte* (Sport), National Institute of Sports. The sponsoring organization has the sole responsibility for the organization, structure, editorial policy and operation of its publication, although party ideological planners and central government officials have coordinating powers and considerable influence on matters of policy. Because of the diversification of control of the periodic press and its insulation from direct supervision, most magazines and journals enjoy greater latitude to comment on political issues, although mostly from the perspective of their sponsoring organizations or their constituencies.²⁰ Not surprisingly, the most influential magazine, *Verde Olivo* (Olive Green), is published by the Revolutionary Armed Forces, probably the most powerful sector in Cuban government.

Film. The first official act of the new Castro government in the area of mass communication was to establish in 1959 the Cuban Institute of Cinema Art and Industry (ICAIC) under the direction of Alfredo Guevara, prerevolutionary radical and schoolmate of Castro. Today every aspect of the film industry, including casting, production, distribution, promotion, exhibition and importation, is dominated by ICAIC, which is an administrative division of the Ministry of Culture.

Despite the centralized control, the film industry, under Guevara's continued

leadership, has become one of the most (if not the most) popular, pervasive, vital and controversial media in Cuba.²¹ Most films are documentaries designed to mobilize the people behind revolutionary goals, although a few feature films have been produced and some have gained international acclaim. Foreign films, including many from the United States, are shown and enthusiastically received by the avid Cuban moviegoers. There have been, however, several highly publicized instances in which foreign films have been withdrawn from Cuban theaters following controversies concerning their political content.²² In addition to a large number of theaters, Cuba uses mobile cinema units to distribute films in the countryside.

Books. The book industry also is organized under the Ministry of Culture, but its control is somewhat more decentralized than the film industry. Ten publishing houses share the printing, distribution and editorial responsibilities, usually according to the editorial content. The most notable exception is Casa de las Americas (House of the Americas), Cuba's major book publisher and literary focal point. Casa de las Americas technically is an independent publisher without official ties to either the party or the government, but many of the publishing house's staff also hold positions in the Ministry of Culture, and the director of Casa de las Americas, Haydee Santamaria, formerly was married to Armando Hart, Minister of Culture. Both are long-time collaborators with Castro and hold other positions in the top echelons of the party and government.

In the two decades of revolutionary Cuba, millions of books have been published under thousands of titles, but the overwhelming majority were textbooks. Only a small percentage of the books are for popular reading, and most of those carry a political message. Despite a few highly celebrated cases (e.g. the imprisonment of writer Heberto Padilla in 1971 for counter-revolutionary works), less discussion of contemporary issues is found in books than in other print media.²³ During the late 1960s and early 1970s, very few works of foreign authors, even those of a leftist persuasion, were imported or reprinted in Cuba. In recent years, the restrictions have eased somewhat, and some U.S. and other foreign titles can be found in Havana, but no discussion of revolutionary goals is available to the public.²⁴

News Agency. The Cuban news agency, Prensa Latina, is the primary source of foreign news for all Cuban media. The agency has bureaus in several countries around the world but maintains a relatively small staff. In many countries, the agency is represented by a local stringer. The agency claims that it receives no government subsidies and pays all its expenses with fees charged from its subscribers, although few of the world's media use the service compared to other national and international services.

On paper, Prensa Latina is independent of direct government or party supervision. The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency has reported several instances in which Prensa Latina correspondents were expelled from host countries for questionable political activities or were observed performing diplomatic functions in the Cuban embassies as well as their journalistic functions.²⁵ Therefore, it is assumed that the Ministry of Foreign Relations has considerable authority over

the operation of the news agency. All of the news agency's content is reported within the ideological context of Cuban communism, and no criticism of the Cuban government, even of minor bureaucratic inefficiencies, is transmitted.

Control of the Cuban Mass Media

As previously discussed, this monograph is predicated on the assumption that control always exists in the mass communication process regardless of the structure of the media system or the political ideology of the government. Therefore, the fact that the Cuban mass media are controlled is not particularly important, despite the protestations of many Western critics. What is important in a systems perspective is an understanding of the degree, nature and consequences of those controls. The main purpose in the following description is to demonstrate that control of the Cuban media is not monolithic. Rather the media are subject to a wide variety of controls from the source, channel and audience subsystems as well as the larger environment.

Source Control. Source controls exercised almost exclusively by the revolutionary elite in the Cuban government and communist party are the most powerful and obvious controls in the mass communication process. The simple fact that Cuba subscribes to a Marxist approach means that the mass media are totally absorbed into the government. Under the present structure, there will be no independent ownership of the media, according to Castro:

If you asked us if a newspaper could appear here against socialism, I say honestly, no, it cannot appear. It would not be allowed by the party, the government, or the people. In that sense we do not have the freedom of the press that you have in your country (the United States) . . . Our mass media serve the Revolution.²⁶

But ownership of the Cuban media is, by no means, the only control that affects the outcome of Cuban mass communication. Other formal government controls and important informal controls also influence the process.

The new Cuban constitution, ratified by popular referendum in 1976, legitimizes the concept that a citizen's right to speak freely is subordinate to the good of the state. Article 52 states:

Citizens have freedom of speech and of the press in keeping with the objectives of socialist society. Material conditions for the exercise of that right are provided by the fact that the press, radio, television, movies, and other organs of the mass media are state or social property and can never be private property. This assures their use for the exclusive service of the working people and in the interest of society.²⁷

Those rights are further limited by Article 61:

None of the freedoms which are recognized for the citizens can be exercised contrary to what is established in the Constitution and the law, or contrary to the existence and objectives of the socialist state, or contrary to the decision of the Cuban people to build socialism and communism. Violations of this principle can be punished by law.²⁸

Legal punishment of Cuban writers guilty of counter-revolutionary behavior is a control that was used even before it was legitimized in the new constitution, although the extent to which the control was used in comparison to other forms of control is probably overstated. Instances such as the imprisonment of Heberto Padilla have become *causes celebres*, but they actually do not reflect business as usual in Cuban mass communication. In reality, other subtle controls are so effective in managing the mass media that overt repression is rare.

The Inter American Press Association, a regional group of publishers of privately owned media and a long-time critic of the Castro government, regularly reports on the status of several journalists who are among the approximately 3,000 political prisoners in Cuban jails. Several of the journalists have been jailed since the early 1960s. Cuban editors readily admit that some prerevolutionary journalists are in jail but insist they are imprisoned for civil crimes. "The journalists of Batista's time were thieves and gangsters," said Elio Constantin, sub-director of *Granma*. "They are (in jail) because they committed crimes ⁹ like any other country—but not for writing."²⁹

Censorship is another formal government control that is usually overestimated by observers outside of Cuba. As will be documented below, those in editorial positions are in sympathy with revolutionary goals and, therefore, don't have to be censored. "Like any editors, we have to select some things and reject others," said Roberto Fernandez, editor of *Casa de las Americas* literary magazine. "But we have no censorship in the sense that there is a censor apart from the editor, who acts from ideological criteria."³⁰

The Department of Revolution Orientation (DOR), a division of the Central Committee of the Cuban Communist Party, has been described as the Cuban "censorship board,"³¹ but in fact, no published evidence to support the allegation exists. The limited evidence available on the functions and powers of DOR indicates that it does have some authority to supervise Cuba's propaganda activities and, perhaps, to set general media political policies.³² Evidence also indicates that DOR's authority has fluctuated greatly in recent years and frequently has been contested by other agencies in the hierarchy, such as the Ministry of Culture. It appears, at present, that DOR's responsibilities are less policy-setting and more operational—expressing ideological policy formulated by the Central Committee and coordinating the implementation of the policy by the various mass media. Regardless, an analysis of the Department of Revolutionary Orientation is a much needed addition to the literature on the Cuban media.

Although formal government controls are important, informal controls from the source subsystem, usually in the form of the subtle process of socialization, probably are the most salient in Cuban mass communication. Tichenor, Donohue and Olien, after a review of the literature on communication control, suggest the proposition that "control over mass media content by a source system is a function of the degree to which media channel members identify with the source system."³³ In the case of Cuba, communicators are, with rare exception, ideologically aligned with the goals of the Revolution and, in numerous instances, also hold top leadership positions in the party and government. In fact, the cooperation of the channel subsystem by the source subsystem is so complete that it

may be said that, whereas Marxist-Leninist theory dictates that communicators must be servants of the state, Cuban media policy-makers and, to a large degree, practitioners are not only servants of the state, they are the state.

To document this symbiosis between the Cuban mass media and officialdom, a list of all those appearing to have policy-making powers in the mass media was prepared and compared to listings of the leadership.³⁴ All individuals listed in standard reference sources on Cuba as having positions of considerable influence in policy planning for mass media were included. The list excludes those top government officials who have influence on media policy but whose duties are primarily outside of the supervision of the mass media (e.g. Castro, Jose Ramon Fernandez, Vice President of the Council of Ministers) and, at the other end of the continuum, those media personnel who have only day-to-day operational responsibilities, such as correspondents or subeditors. Likewise, because virtually every ministry or mass organization has its own media, directors of specific media and their ministerial superiors are not included unless their media are distributed nationally or internationally, are directed to a mass audience, or are considered voices of major powerholders (for example, *Verde Olivo*, Radio Rebelde).

Using these criteria, 45 media policy-makers were identified. Members of this group were then cross checked to determine if they also held high level positions in the Cuban Communist Party, the government, mass organizations or were affiliated with pre-1959 groups that are now in power.

The results (Table 1) demonstrate the depth of the integration between important media actors and the Cuban political elite. Thirty-two (71 percent) of the 45 media policy-makers had at least one significant affiliation with the Cuban power structure. Further, because documentary evidence about Cuban media personnel and the national political leadership is very limited, it is probable that many of those not classified as having a position in the power structure might actually be active in Cuban government and politics. Also, in a few cases, a position was believed to be important in the mass media policy process, but the current holder of that position was unknown and thereby not included in the power structure category.

Of the 32 persons classified as members of the Cuban power structure, 12 (27 percent of the total number of media policy-makers) were subclassified as "ruling elite." In the analysis, this subgroup was defined as having a top leadership role in the country—namely a position in the Central Committee of the party, Council of Ministers, Council of State, National Assembly of the People's Power, or the 26th of July Movement, all major bases of power in Cuba. An example of media policy-makers who are also members of the ruling elite is Jorge Enrique Mendoza, director of *Granma*. In addition to having been one of Castro's top propagandists during the pre-1959 guerrilla warfare in the Sierra Maestra, Mendoza is a member of the Central Committee and a deputy to the National Assembly who formerly held high posts in the Ministry of Education and the National Institute of Agrarian Reform. It is, of course, unlikely that the Cuban government would find the need to censor such a member of the inner circle of power.

Other finding were: 31 percent of the media policy-makers were members of the 26th of July Movement, Castro's guerrilla army, or the Popular Socialist Par-

TABLE 1

Cuban Mass Media Policy-Makers and their Relationship
to the National Power Structure

Non-Media Affiliations	N	% ²
Pre-1959 activities, total	14	31
— 26 July Movement (Castro's guerrilla army)	8	18
— Popular Socialist Party ("old-line communists")	6	13
Communist Party of Cuba (PCC), total	14	31
— member of Central Committee	6	13
— high party official ³	3	7
— former high party official	4	9
Government of the National Assembly of the People's Power, total	21	47
— member, Council of State/Ministers	2	4
— deputy, National Assembly	7	16
— high government official ⁴	14	31
— former high government officials	13	29
Mass Organizations		
— high officials, total	17	38
Cuban Ruling Elite, total ⁵	12	27
Cuban Power Structure (total of those having one or more of the above non-media affiliations)	32	71
No Affiliations/Unknown	13	29
TOTAL	45	100

¹ The list of names and/or positions of the mass media policy-makers and tabulations of their non-media affiliations from which this table is derived appears in the Appendix.

² Numbers total more than 100 percent because many of the policy-makers are affiliated with more than one of the following groups in the Cuban power structure.

³ Primary criteria for being a "high party official" is listing in the CIA directories. A typical position would be a section chief in the Department of Revolutionary Orientation.

⁴ Primary criteria for being a "high government official" is listing in the CIA directories. Typical positions of this description would be an embassy attache, subminister or high ranking military officer.

⁵ "Ruling elite" is defined as membership in the Central Committee of the party, Council of State, Council of Ministers, National Assembly, or the 26th of July Movement.

ty, a group of "old line" Communists who opposed Batista and continue to be an important power faction today; 31 percent of the media policy-makers also hold or previously held important offices in the Cuban Communist Party; 47 percent hold or held high positions in the government, such as ministerial posts; and 38 percent currently are ranking members of one of the semi-official mass organizations, such as the labor unions or farmers' association.

The previous media experience of these policy-makers also was noted. Only 38 percent of the policy-makers came either from lower-level operational positions in the media they now supervise or from leadership posts in other media. In short, for only a small percentage was there some evidence that media experience, not just party or government service, was a factor in being selected for the present positions. The fact that much less than a majority of the media policy-makers were identified as having such experience further indicates the cooptation of the channel by the source subsystem.

Although Table 1, based on 1978 data, indicates considerable integration of media and government in Cuba, a similar analysis conducted during previous periods of the Cuban Revolution probably would have found an even higher level of integration. In the past few years, several of the most widely known media moguls have moved to other, usually higher, positions in the party or government. For example, Isidoro Malmierca, a prerevolutionary Communist and former editor of *Granma*, is now the Minister of Foreign Relations in addition to being a deputy in the National Assembly and a member of the Central Committee of the party. The former Minister of Communication, Jesus Montane, was an original member of Castro's rebel army and a participant in the attack on Moncada barracks (generally regarded as opening night of the Revolution). He is now a member of the Central Committee of the party, chief of one of its administrative divisions and a deputy to the National Assembly. Another longtime member of the 26th of July Movement, Jorge Serguera, was director-general of Cuban radio and television, Castro's favorite media. Serguera, who was an ambassador to African countries, Judge Advocate of the Army, prosecutor in Revolutionary Tribunals (including that of Hubert Matos) and a provincial military governor, has moved on to a military or diplomatic assignment in Africa, according to incomplete reports. In addition, the third and fourth ranked Cuban leaders, Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, Vice President of the Council of State, and Blas Roca, President of the National Assembly, both were previously editors of *Hoy*, the now defunct newspaper of the Communist party.

The point is that although a high percentage of the Cuban media policy-makers also are members of the government and political hierarchy, the percentage was even greater in past years. Today, positions in the media leadership are being increasingly filled by younger technocrats who have come up through the ranks of the party or government bureaucracy. Nonetheless, many of the oldtimers remain in powerful positions and, although as a group the media policy-makers now seem to be slightly less integrated into the ruling elite, there is no evidence that they are any less committed to revolutionary goals. Further, it may be argued that Tichenor, Donohue and Olien's aforementioned proposition (that greater control of media content was related to the degree to which the channel identifies

with the source) should be modified to indicate a curvilinear relationship. It is possible that channel actors reach a point of inflection at which they become so absorbed into the source subsystem that they gain greater latitude in editorial decision-making. For example, Santamaria of Casa de las Americas and Guevara of the film industry are two of the most trusted members of the ruling inner circle and, perhaps as a result, their media have been more experimental and controversial and seem to have greater editorial discretion, while remaining well within revolutionary goals. Further examination of this source-channel relationship is warranted.

Not only do the media policy-makers closely identify with the Revolution, so too do the lower-level media practitioners. In his recent and important work on the Cuban Revolution, Jorge I. Domínguez tabulated membership in the Communist party by occupational sectors. An abbreviated version of his findings, which appear in Table 2, shows that 25.2 percent of Cuban journalists are members of the Communist party. Another 16.4 percent are members of the Communist Youth Union. For comparison, 2.2 percent of the general population are members of the party.³⁵ Domínguez concludes that the data "serve as a guide to what is important in Cuba: Control over the mass media, science, and the military is much more important than control over local labor unions."³⁶ And as further testimony to practicing journalists' identity with the source subsystem, a young *Granma* reporter interviewed in Havana said that there were no restrictions on her editorial judgment but added, "My sympathies are with the Revolution. You should understand that from the beginning. So . . . I'm not trying to bring anything new . . . or anything in a manner of opposition."³⁷

TABLE 2
Party or Communist Youth Membership by Sector in 1970s

Sector	%	%	Total %
	Communist Party	Communist Youth Union	
Journalists	25.2	16.4	41.6
Construction	—	—	14.16
Maritime, port workers	—	—	38.5
Communist construction brigade	17.2	20.2	37.4
Academy of Science	50.0	—	—
Armed forces officers	—	—	85.0
Cardboard enterprise	3.0	—	—
High-productivity cane cutters	11.9	3.8	15.7
Local union leaders	5.3	7.8	13.1
Secretarial school students	—	23.0	—
Ministry of Interior	—	—	70.0

Source: Jorge I. Domínguez, *Cuba: Order and Revolution* (Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1978), p. 319.

Channel Controls. Of the dozens of editors and directors of the major Cuban media interviewed in Havana in 1977 and 1979, all claimed that their medium had complete editorial independence and vigorously denied that any government or party agency could intervene in content decisions. Supervision from the various government agencies, such as the Ministry of Communication or the Cuban Institute of Radio and Television (IRCT), was only on technical or administrative matters, according to them.

"Those who are sympathizers of Pinochet (the Chilean right-wing military dictator) you will not hear on Radio Rebelde, but that is not an order of the government or IRCT. It is the decision of Radio Rebelde," said Luis Mas Martin, director of Radio Rebelde and prerevolutionary collaborator with Castro. "Each station has its own independence to work out its own policy of what . . . to broadcast."³⁸

Regardless of the validity of the claim of complete editorial independence, it is clear that there are powerful channel controls which affect the content produced in the Cuban mass communication process. It is assumed in the following discussion of these channel controls that normal administrative, editorial and social controls operate in Cuban newsrooms similar to newsrooms elsewhere in the world. Cuban editors, the same as editors abroad, have the administrative power to hire, fire and promote the reporters on their staff base,³⁹ on the editors' appraisal of the reporters' performance. The criteria used might be ideologically based. Cuban editors also have the normal powers to assign specific news stories and to edit or cut copy according to their concept of news. Further, it is assumed that subtle social controls, by which members of a news organization quickly learn and accept through informal group pressures the unstated rules of behavior for the group, also are present.⁴⁰ What is important is not these controls, but rather the controls that distinguish Cuban mass media from other media.

The most conspicuous controls are those exercised by the Union of Cuban Journalists and the National Union of Cuban Writers and Artists. All journalists, novelists, poets and playwrights, must be members of one of those unions in order to practice their craft. Both unions establish and strictly enforce standards that govern the media and, to some extent, private behaviors of all their members. Those who violate union policies can lose their accreditation and, thus, their right to publish. The unions also have less overt methods of controlling their membership, such as the power to select the writers who will be published by the major publishing houses, publication of journalism or literary reviews that criticize deviations from policy, regular evaluations of writers' work as a basis for pay raises, and the responsibility for ideological and technical training of their members.⁴⁰

The latter responsibility, the education of mass communicators, is immensely important. Studies in the United States and in other Latin American countries have found that journalism instruction has a significant socializing effect on the news values of reporters.⁴¹ Although the unions are preeminent in journalism training, two journalism schools, one at the University of Havana and the other at the University of the Oriente, share the function. Both universities are divisions of the Ministry of Higher Education, and faculty and students are selected, at

least in part, according to political criteria.⁴² James W. Carty Jr., who studied journalism education in Cuba and interviewed teachers and students there, concluded that "Socialist ideology is as important as writing techniques in the teaching of communication majors in Cuba."⁴³ He noted that ideological orientation begins in the freshman year with two courses in Marxist philosophy and is continued throughout the four and one-half year program. The impact of the university programs, however, appears to be small. Editors and directors of major Cuban media report that few university-trained journalists find their ways into Cuban newsrooms, that those who do are inadequately trained and must be retooled and that the vast majority of their staffs are trained on the job.⁴⁴

Audience Controls. During the first decade and a half of the Revolution, the Cuban mass media were little more than loudspeakers for Castro and his inner circle, and the audience was regarded as a dumping ground for messages proselytizing them to meet revolutionary goals. Since the early 1970s, that situation has changed somewhat, in part because of a changing political-economic environment and in part because of a growing realization among the ruling elite that some degree of feedback is essential to effective communication and, in turn, to the political system. To characterize the audience as an equal partner in today's Cuban mass communication process would be an exaggeration, but there are strong indications that the mass communicators are paying increasing attention to the audience's opinions in formulating media content. Furthermore, it would be misleading to suggest that a negative public opinion could deter media policymakers from their use of the mass media in mobilizing popular support for the Revolution. Audience participation in the mass communication process is the means by which communicators can better understand the nature of the audience and the effect of the messages on the audience. Armed with that knowledge, the communicators attempt to improve their means of prodding the masses down the road to socialist utopia. In short, the audience subsystem has increasing control capabilities on tactical media decisions, but not on strategic decisions.

The most noteworthy of these audience controls is the increasing use of audience research by the Cuban mass media. In 1971, the Institute of Research and Orientation on Domestic Needs was established to study the Cuban people's needs for consumer goods and services so that state producers and distributors could better serve the public. The institute is staffed with about a hundred social scientists and assistants and regularly conducts extensive surveys, using methodologically sound sampling methods. The institute also performs laboratory experiments with consumers and has designed sophisticated computer simulations of consumer needs.⁴⁵ In the mid-1970s, the institute's services were expanded to the mass media, and now major broadcasting networks and print media receive systematically collected audience data at least twice per year.

Editors and directors report that they are not yet entirely comfortable with using the social science research methods and that they still use less formal means of gauging public opinion. The Cuban Institute of Radio and Television, its individual networks and stations, and the major newspapers have "complaints" or "correspondence" sections that receive letters from their audience regarding a wide range of subjects, including comments on programming and editorial con-

tent. Some media receive as many as 1,000 letters per week, and much of the feedback is broadcast or published.⁴⁶ A recent content analysis of the letters-to-the-editor column in *Granma* found that 5 percent of the "negative concerns" and 21 percent of the "positive concerns" published in the column were directed at editorial policies or journalistic efforts.⁴⁷ Radio Rebelde airs a weekly program titled "Criticism of Radio and Television" in which audience members are encouraged to write or call in with their comments on programming on Cuban broadcasting, including criticism of its own network, as well as discussion of more general social or political issues.

"While we know that it is not totally scientific to measure our effect through the mail," said Juan Hernandez, director of Radio Liberacion, "we do know that for every letter there will be a certain number of people with similar opinions behind each of those letters."⁴⁸

Another form of audience research is conducted in cooperation with the semi-official mass organizations, especially the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution (CDR). According to Luis Mas, director of Radio Rebelde, the neighborhood political committees can visit the homes of 170,000 Cubans within 15 minutes after a broadcast to determine if they listened to it and to probe their reactions.⁴⁹

Audience research seems to have some effect as a control over the Cuban mass communication process. "There is a censor (in Cuba)," said Leslie Rodriguez, director of the Directorate of Television, ICRT, "Those are the members of the people. They complain and express their hostility, and we take the program off the air."⁵⁰ Both Rodriguez and other media policy-makers interviewed in Havana said that frequently programming is either modified or terminated if it is consistently criticized by the audiences, but all agree that if a program is unpopular but at the same time serves an important informational or political function in the view of the policy-makers it will not be taken off the air.

"We understand that there are numbers of people who will change the dial, and we all understand very clearly that the easiest thing in the world to do is to change the dial," Hernandez of Radio Liberacion concluded. "But we also understand that there is a great public that requires, needs or desires our form of programming and so we feel our responsibility is to that segment of the listening audience."⁵¹

Another means by which the Cuban media policy-makers have attempted to increase audience control on the mass communication process has been to broaden the base of communicators preparing the messages. According to Ernesto Vera, president of the Union of Cuban Journalists:

The mass media reflect the daily events of the people, the direct actor of the revolutionary play. But, under the new conceptions of the socialist society, the actor can and should be at the same time the disseminator and co-author of the press.⁵²

In congruence with the Marxist goal of a classless society, the media have attempted to de-emphasize the role of a professional corps of reporters and enlarge the role of citizen contributors. Under the direction of the Union of Cuban Journalists, the Voluntary Correspondents' Movement was formed. Approximately

15,000 workers, peasants, soldiers, and members of the mass organizations have been recruited, indoctrinated and trained to collect and write articles for the provincial and national media.⁵³ Similarly, Cuban broadcasters have attempted to broaden citizen participation in programming. For example, individual stations regularly hold competitions, limited to amateur scriptwriters or composers, to select new programming to be broadcast nationally.⁵⁴

This complex array of control from the interrelated subsystems of the source, channel and audience, to a large extent, determines the outcome of the Cuban mass communication process. But, of course, the mass communication system does not operate in a vacuum; it affects and, in turn, is affected by numerous linkages with the environment at large. The Cuban mass media constantly are adapting to changing relationships in national and international systems, such as domestic political and economic imperatives and foreign policy considerations with the United States, USSR and the Third World. Nonetheless, an understanding of the control structure of the mass media will help us to understand and predict changes in their function for Cuban society.

Functions of the Cuban Mass Media

The question in this final section is: What functions do the mass media perform for Cuban society as a result of the unique combination of controls? In answering this question, special attention will be given to the aforementioned hypothesis of Tichenor, Donohue and Olien that the complexity and differentiation of the social system is related to the type of function (feedback control and distribution control) served by the mass media.

Distribution Control. There is ample evidence that the Cuban mass media, under the direction of the Castro government, have consistently practiced distribution control by withholding or selectively distributing messages for the purpose of maintaining the revolutionary process. Since the early 1960s, the media primarily have served the function of education, ideological development and integration of the masses, in accordance with Marxist-Leninist principles of media use. The media were leading actors in the national literacy campaign of the 1960s, in agitating the masses to meet production goals and in sustaining morale during decades of hardship. "Certainly there is no question that the Cuban leadership perceives the mass media as being of prime importance for political mobilization and character formation," Fagen said.⁵⁵ After studying mass mobilization in Cuba, he concluded:

Even casual observers of the Cuban scene have been struck by the extent to which social and political life have been reorganized under Castro in order to provide the Cuban citizen with a carefully controlled view of the world. The carriers of the officially approved images fall . . . into the following five categories: (1) mass media, (2) armed forces, (3) mass organizations, (4) special school and structures, and (5) the Party.⁵⁶

Official censorship or repression are the most often cited forms of distribution control, and indeed in Cuba there have been occasional instances of both, but the preceding sections have demonstrated that other forms of distribution control have been widely and effectively used. Regardless of the specific method, distribution control has been and continues to be the foremost function of Cuban

mass communication.

Institutionalization of the Cuban Revolution. The first decade of the Cuban Revolution, like most true social revolutions, is characterized by trial and error, volatility, fits and starts, and constant instability. But after the pivotal year of 1970, Cuba gained increasing political maturity and economic stability in the process of institutionalization. The radical economic and political policies of the 1960s, which attempted to mobilize the masses behind grandiose development plans, moral incentives, romantic revolutionary ideology and the personalistic leadership of Castro, were a disaster. By 1970, the economy was in chaos, basic goods were in short supply, repression of any form of dissent or deviance prevailed, the Cuban people were dissatisfied and the future course of the Revolution was in doubt. Castro responded predictably to the crisis by giving one of his greatest speeches. On July 26, 1970, he went before a national radio and television audience and admitted failure. He said that Cuba's problems were due, in part, to an inbreeding of ideas within his inner circle of advisers, excessive centralization of government functions and insensitivity to the needs of the people. To overcome that, Castro promised greater independence and democracy, decentralization of government and increased public participation in decision-making.

The promised reforms were slow in coming, but by the end of the decade most Cuban scholars agreed that the country's social and political structures had changed markedly. The radicalism of the 1960s was replaced by institutionalization. In his book, *Cuba in the 1970s: Pragmatism and Institutionalization*, Carmelo Meas-Lago summarized the process as follows:

The former personalistic-charismatic regime is being transformed by delegation of power from the "maximum leader" to technocrats, separation of functions of the administration, the party, and the armed forces, and revitalization of the party, the unions, and other mass organizations.⁵⁷

Cuban government was growing more complex. Structures in the political systems were becoming more differentiated. An expanding bureaucracy was contributing more to making and enforcing rules. And the means of public representation in decision-making were increased. Numerous studies support that conclusion. For example, Nelson P. Valdes reported the continued growth of the bureaucracy and suggests that institutionalization may be the outcome of long-term conflict between the revolutionary leadership and state-economic bureaucracy.⁵⁸ Edward Gonzalez documented a broadening of the political leadership which resulted in "the delegation of effective decision-making powers from Fidel Castro and his immediate entourage to new and more technically qualified appointees and to governmental agencies that could now function in more regularized and orderly fashion . . ."⁵⁹ William M. LeoGrande concluded from a longitudinal study that the Cuban Communist Party, which was powerless in the 1960s, has grown stronger politically compared to the military, the traditional source of power in Cuba.⁶⁰

But the showpiece of the new Cuba is the *poder popular*, a political structure established by the new Cuban constitution approved in a national referendum in 1976. The constitution grants the Cuban electorate the right to vote for represen-

tatives to local government bodies that have prime responsibility for running community services. The representatives, in turn, elect delegates to the provincial and national assemblies. The assemblies are confined to debating local issues and do not discuss, much less overturn, national and international policies established by the revolutionary leadership.

The candidates for office are nominated at neighborhood meetings and elected by a plurality of the secret ballots. In the 1979 election, the second round of voting since the country adopted the constitution, 98 percent of Cubans 16 years and older cast ballots. After their election, the representatives must return to their constituencies at established intervals to hear complaints. If the constituents are not satisfied with their representation, they have the power to impeach their representatives, an action taken approximately 100 times since the new constitution was implemented.⁶¹

According to Archibald R.M. Ritter, these political changes in Cuba have had two major results. First, they have broadened the political process, especially at the local level, by providing "a significant degree of popular control over the leadership selection process and substantial responsiveness on the part of the assemblies to the wishes of the constituents."⁶² Second, the elections have consolidated and legitimized the pre-existing revolutionary leadership. Only 3.3 percent of the national deputies are not affiliated with the communist party or the Union of Communist Youth, and at the executive levels of the national assembly, such as the Council of State, party stalwarts and old-guard revolutionaries have consolidated their power and in some cases increased it.⁶³

In summary, the process of institutionalization taking place in Cuba during the 1970s has had three marked effects that relate to the function of the Cuban mass media. First, a greater number of political structures have been created. Second, the size and power of the bureaucracy have increased. Third, the Cuban people have been granted a greater voice in government decision-making. To accommodate these structural changes, the function of the mass media would be expected to change also.

Feedback Control. Castro blamed the economic disaster of 1970 and the resulting public disenchantment in part on a lack of communication with his people. He felt that he had become too insulated from public opinion and, thus, had made tactical decisions out of touch with reality. In his famous July 26th speech, he proposed a return to the interaction between the government and the people characteristic during the early days of the Revolution, encouraged the masses to criticize government inefficiency and recommend solutions to domestic problems, and suggested that the mass media should be channels for this new dialogue.⁶⁴

Available evidence indicates that, after a few years of transition, the Cuban mass media began to respond in the late 1970s to the changes taking place elsewhere in the national system. Instead of serving almost entirely a distribution control function as they had for the first decade of the Revolution, the mass media performed an expanded role of feedback control in which they facilitated the flow of information about system performance among and between subsystems in the increasingly complex Cuban national system. The feedback control, exercised

vertically from the masses to the government or horizontally between political elites, became a method of applying corrective pressure on the system to adapt to changing circumstances.

The primary means of vertical feedback control via the mass media began in 1974 when the Cuban newspapers began to publish reports of the municipal meetings initiated by the *poder popular*. Many of the discussions at those meetings were very critical of local services and bureaucratic administration and dealt with a wide variety of issues below the policy level, yet the newspapers reported them diligently. Shortly after, *Granma*, the party newspaper, launched "By Return Mail" a consumer action column to which citizens could write with their complaints. A content analysis of that column by Ernesto E. Rodriguez indicates that a significant percent of the letters expressed "negative concerns."⁶⁵ Nearly a third of the items published during the two years studied were critical of the state, its bureaucracy and services. Another small percent was critical of interpersonal issues or editorial judgment. Thus, a total of 36 percent of the coded items were negative compared with 10 percent that were positive. The remainder was neutral. Despite the tilt toward critical letters in the *Granma* column, not one letter was "negative to a national, ideological, or political theme or effort." In short, the column emphasized "constructive criticism" directed at improving the efficiency of government and implementing revolutionary goals, not at undermining basic principles. The most recurrent complaints were about the transit system, garbage collection and the quality of food products.

In short order, *Juventud Rebelde* and other media began to offer public feedback services, most of which are widely read and receive an avalanche of letters each week. And as the popularity of the columns has grown, the newspapers have taken on more active roles in investigating the complaints and demanding accountability for the abuses that were substantiated by their teams of investigative reporters.⁶⁶ A 1979 investigation by *Bohemia* magazine, for example, revealed that a municipal representative had misused public funds. Shortly after publication, the delegate was recalled by his constituents and subsequently jailed for the crime.⁶⁷ There have been numerous other instances in which the low level government officials have been dismissed, demoted, or discredited as a result of this investigative reporting. The consumer action column is "encouraging people to write in about what they know and it has lots of bureaucrats scurrying to clean up their houses," a veteran Cuban journalist told a U.S. correspondent.⁶⁸

Other means of feedback control now in use by the Cuban mass media are panel discussions among citizens from various sectors of society, man-on-the-street interviews, and occasional cases of public opinion polling on social issues. Regardless of the means, a regular perusal of the Cuban media indicates a consistent attempt to link the masses and the increasingly distant leadership. By allowing this discussion under the controlled conditions in the mass media, the leadership receives some sense of public opinion necessary for effective decision-making without opening up the entire system to debate, criticism and possible disruption. The government receives useful intelligence, and the masses have a chance for catharsis without jeopardizing the survival of the Revolution. Permitting criticism within the confines of the Revolution has the additional advantage of

helping the leadership in educating and mobilizing the masses. In order to articulate a complaint, a citizen is more likely to be educated in basic communication skills and sufficiently understand public issues and policy guidelines, indicating a degree of integration into the revolutionary process.

The Cuban press also was used as a channel for discussion of a limited number of articles to the draft constitution in 1976. The public was allowed to debate the adoption of minor items that did not affect substantive policy. Opinions on both sides were aired in the media, and the proposed legislation was eventually defeated. Subsequently, the public was invited to comment on the new Family Code, and after lively discussion of the merits of specific articles within the bill, some changes were made in the final law.⁶⁹ The press had not undercut the basic concept of the legislation, but it did serve as a vehicle through which the political elites gathered information that helped them fine tune the legislative proposal.

There also are indications that the Cuban mass media are fulfilling a horizontal feedback control function by carrying information between an increasing number of political elites and systemic power bases. The implementation of *poder popular* resulted in a greater number of people in high level posts. The government structure added 10,725 delegates to the municipal assemblies, 1,084 to the provincial assemblies, and 481 deputies to the national assembly.⁷⁰ Membership of the Central Committee of the party also increased from 91 to 112 during the reorganization, and new government and party divisions proliferated.⁷¹ That greater number and differentiation of power bases naturally led to a diversity of needs and, to a limited extent, a diversity of opinions within the system. Gonzales noted:

While there exists a high level of elite consensus, I do not hold the Cuban regime to be monolithic. Rather, there are divisions within the Cuban leadership which stem from differences among political elites in their ideological and issue orientations, power considerations, and bureaucratic and organizational interests.⁷²

A major outcome of the expansion and differentiation of the leadership is the development of means of relaying information from one sector of government to another and especially from the sectors to the top echelon of Castro and the other highest powerholders. Dominguez found indications of considerable lobbying among members of the political elite to change draft legislation in the best interest of the sectors that those elites represent.⁷³ One of the more popular methods of lobbying has been mass communication, particularly through the printed press. Virtually every major sector of the power structure has its own newspaper, magazine or journal. *Granma* is the official voice of the Communist party. *Verde Olivo* represents the traditional power base of the military. *Los Trabajadores* speaks for the trade unions, and so on for most of the major power contenders in the Cuban national system. Domestic political elites and foreign scholars carefully search the major publications for clues of changes in policy within the sectors. For example, emphasis on a topic by *Verde Olivo* usually signals a change in the position of the powerful military sector and is likely to be translated into national policy. On occasion, the publications of diverse sectors at-

tach different agendas to national needs, issues and policies by emphasizing matters of greatest concern to their sectors, offering an obligatory nod to matters more relevant to others and never deviating from previously stated national policies.

A recent content analysis of the Cuban press yields some support for this conclusion that different Cuban publications set different agendas. The five Cuban publications, which were analyzed in three time periods, set different agendas in some content categories, and these agendas tended to vary in relation to the degree of social differentiation in Cuba. The data contradict the conventional wisdom that the Cuban press is monolithic in content and functions and strongly indicate that substantial changes have occurred in the Cuban press during the last decade.¹⁴

In addition, the comments of the editors of Cuba's major newspapers support the contention that the media are increasingly serving the function of horizontal feedback control. "We are the newspaper of the party," Mendoza of *Granma* said. "But we are compelled to publish things of the state because it does not have its own newspaper." Both he and Lopez of *Juventud Rebelde* said that situations might arise in which the best interests of the party and the state might not be the same, and therefore each sector should have its own voice. Reflective of that attitude, the newspaper of the unions, *Los Trabajadores*, in 1978 expanded from weekly publication to three times per week, and plans for a new state newspaper were being discussed.¹⁵ In sum, evidence suggest that, correlated to the differentiation of the Cuban political structure, the mass media are responsible for a limited amount of carefully supervised feedback control. On a vertical plane, the press registers a sample of public grievances as a form of intelligence for the government and release for the masses, and on a horizontal plane, publications representing various sectors of society advocate their positions in the national forum. In neither case, however, does the content of the feedback deviate from revolutionary goals or threaten the present leadership; rather the feedback-control function helps the government to respond to changing conditions and thus maintain the course of the Revolution.

SUMMARY

Based on the systems perspective advocated by Tichenor, Donohue and Olien, the organization, control and functions of the Cuban mass media were studied. With the assumption that the media, as interdependent parts of a total social system, control and are controlled by other subsystems, the nature of those controls was examined to determine the consequences of mass communication in Cuban society. Media control can be functional in managing social tension that exists in all social systems, or it can be dysfunctional by stifling the creativity needed for the system to adapt to changing circumstances. Regardless, control is always present, and the absence of government control of the media simply means that the void will be filled by another segment of the social structure. The various combinations of control, in turn, will determine the functions the media

system will serve for society. Two maintenance functions of the media have been identified. The first is distribution control of withholding or selectively distributing information. The second is feedback control by which corrective pressure is placed on subsystems out of functional balance. Which of these functions the mass media are likely to perform is related to the complexity and differentiation of the social system.

In the 1960s, the Cuban mass media underwent frequent change that reflected the volatility of the revolutionary process. Today, although all mass communication operates under Marxist-Leninist principles, Cuban media are organized in varying fashions. In the case of broadcasting, the organization is highly centralized. In the case of the other media it is relatively decentralized. Under this diverse organizational structure, the control of the Cuban media is not monolithic; rather it comes in different forms from different subsystems. Of course, controls exercised by the revolutionary elite, such as formal censorship and the more frequent subtle cooptation, are the most powerful and obvious in the process, but there are increasing indications that other subsystems, most notably the mass audience, also are exercising control over media content.

This inventory and analysis of the Cuban mass media found evidence to support the proposition that the more differentiated and pluralistic the system, the more likely the mass media are to perform a feedback-control function as well as a distribution-control function. After the economic disaster of 1970, Castro reorganized his government to include a larger and more diverse power structure and more mass participation in public decision-making. Reflecting these changes in society, the mass media now are serving an expanded role of feedback control as well as the traditional distribution control. Public criticism of the tactical operations of the government is transmitted vertically, and advocacy of the needs of major sectors of the power structure are carried horizontally by the mass media to the political elite, namely Castro and his closest advisers. That allows broadly based sectors of an increasingly complex and institutionalized Cuban society to discuss certain issues among themselves and with the leadership without disrupting the progress of the Revolution.

Castro best summarized the role of the Cuban mass media, especially the feedback-control function, and heralded its implementation in an interview with U.S. journalist Lee Lockwood in 1965:

There is very little criticism (in the Cuban press). An enemy of Socialism cannot write in our newspapers—but we don't deny it, and we don't go around proclaiming a hypothetical freedom of the press where it actually doesn't exist, the way you people do. Furthermore, I admit that our press is deficient in this respect. I don't believe that this lack of criticism is a healthy thing. Rather, criticism is a very useful and positive instrument, and I think that all of us must learn to make use of it . . . Not that I would tell you we delude ourselves that under the present circumstances journalism can have any other function more important than that of contributing to the political and revolutionary goals of our country. We have a goal, a program, an objective to fulfill, and that objective essentially controls the activity of the journalists.²⁸

NOTES

1. Herbert L. Matthews, *Revolution in Cuba: An Essay in Understanding* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1975), p. 126.
2. Jean Ziegler, "Government by Television," *IPI Report*, February 1960, p. 2.
3. Richard R. Fagen, *Politics and Communication* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1966), p. 7. See for example: Richard R. Fagen, "Mass Mobilization in Cuba: The Symbolism of Struggle," in *Cuba in Revolution*, in Rolando E. Bonachea and Nelson P. Valdes, eds., (Garden City, NJ: Anchor Books, 1972); Jorge I. Domínguez, *Cuba: Order and Revolution* (Cambridge, Mass: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1978); Carmelo Mesa-Lago, *Cuba in the 1970s: Pragmatism and Institutionalization* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1974); Hugh Thomas, *The Cuban Revolution* (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1977); James W. Carty, Jr., *Cuban Communications* (Bethany, W. Va.: Bethany College, 1978).
4. Phillip J. Tichenor, Clarice N. Olien, Annette Harrison and George Donohue, "Mass Communication Systems and Communication Accuracy in Science News Reporting," *Journalism Quarterly*, 47: 673-683 (Winter 1970); George A. Donohue, Phillip J. Tichenor and Clarice N. Olien, "Gatekeeping: Mass Media Systems and Information Control," in F. Gerald Kline and P.J. Tichenor, eds., *Current Perspectives in Mass Communications Research*, (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1972), pp. 41-69; Phillip J. Tichenor, George A. Donohue and Clarice N. Olien, "Mass Communication Research: Evaluation of a Structural Model," *Journalism Quarterly*, 50: 419-425 (Autumn 1973); G.A. Donohue, P.J. Tichenor and C.N. Olien, "Mass Media Functions, Knowledge and Social Control," *Journalism Quarterly*, 50: 652-659 (Winter 1973).
5. John C. Merrill, *The Imperative of Freedom: A Philosophy of Journalistic Autonomy* (New York: Hastings House Publishers, 1974).
6. Considerable support for this view comes from the continuing research program of the research group of Tichenor, Donohue and Olien. See for example Phillip J. Tichenor, George A. Donohue and Clarice N. Olien, *Community Conflict & The Press* (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1980).
7. Donohue, Tichenor and Olien, "Gatekeeping," op. cit., pp. 43-44.
8. Ibid., pp. 44-45.
9. Donohue, Tichenor and Olien, "Mass Media Functions," op. cit., p. 654.
10. Clarice N. Olien, George A. Donohue and Phillip J. Tichenor, "The Community Editor's Power and the Reporting of Conflict," *Journalism Quarterly*, 45: 243-252 (Summer 1968).
11. For a more detailed description and analysis of the changing relationship between the Cuban media and government, see Robert N. Pierce in collaboration with John Spicer Nichols, *Keeping the Flame: Media and Government in Latin America* (New York: Hastings House Publishers, 1979).
12. Marvin Alisky, "Havana Havoc," *Nieman Reports*, April 1956, pp. 116-118.
13. John Spicer Nichols, "Republic of Cuba," in George Kurian, ed., *World Press Encyclopedia* (New York: Facts on File, 1982) pp. 257-271. Also see George Volsky, "Cuba: Propaganda as an Instrument of Power and Socioeconomic Development," *Annals of the Southeastern Conference on Latin American Studies* 4: 5-10 (March 1973).
14. Interview with Jorge Lopez Pimentel, editor of *Juventud Rebelde*, Havana, Cuba, Nov. 17, 1977.

15. Howard I. Blutstein, Lynne Cox Anderson, Elinor C. Betters, Deborah Lane, Jonathan A. Leonard and Charles Townsend, *Area Handbook for Cuba* (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1971), DA PAM 550-152, p. 261.

16. Interviews with Leslie Rodriguez Aguilera, director of Directorate of Television, Cuban Institute of Radio and Television (ICRT), and Luis Mas Martin, director, Radio Rebelde, ICRT, Havana, Cuba, April 7, 1979.

17. *Cuba at the Turning Point* (New York: Business International Corporation, 1977), p. 125. This is an excellent source for those interested in the Cuban economy.

18. The newspaper is named for the yacht "Granma" that carried Castro and his rebel force from Mexico to Cuba to start their guerrilla warfare, in effect the vehicle of the revolution.

19. Interview with Lopez Pimentel, loc. cit.

20. Jan Knippers Black, Howard I. Blutstein, J. David Edwards, Kathryn Theresa Johnston and David J. McMorris, *Area Handbook for Cuba* (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976), DA PAM 550-152, p. 316.

21. Andres R. Hernandez, "The Role of Film in Cuban Development," *International Development Review*, 16: 39-40 (1, 1974); Renata Adler, "Cubans Molding Movie Industry Into a Pervasive Force," *The New York Times*, Feb. 11, 1969, p. 26; Renata Adler, "Propaganda Fills Cuban News-reels," *The New York Times*, Feb. 12, 1969, p. 30; Lisandro Otero, *Cultural Policy in Cuba*, Studies and Documents on Cultural Policies (Paris: Unesco, 1972), pp. 38-45.

22. Maurice Halperin, *The Rise and Fall of Fidel Castro: An Essay in Contemporary History* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), pp. 347-361; Blutstein, et al., *Area Handbook*, op. cit., p. 279.

23. For further information on the Padilla case, see Laurdes Casal, *El caso Padilla: Literatura y revolucion en Cuba* (Miami: Universal, 1971); "Cuba: Revolution and the Intellectual — The Strange Case of Heberto Padilla" (special section), *Index on Censorship* 1 (Summer 1972): 65-134; and Matthews, *Revolution in Cuba*, op. cit., pp. 319-339.

24. For more information on the book industry, see Peter Winn, "The State and the Arts: Literary Letter from Cuba," *The New York Times Book Review*, June 10, 1979, pp. 13; 33-39; Seymour Menton, *Prose Fiction of the Cuban Revolution* (Austin and London: University of Texas Press, 1975); Pedro Martinez Pirez, "The Cuban Book Industry," *Granma Weekly Review*, April 9, 1978, p. 8; Andre Schiffrin, "A Publisher's Visit to Cuba," *Publishers' Weekly*, March 25, 1968, pp. 22-25; Black, et al., *Area Handbook*, pp. 326-328, op. cit., pp. 326-328.

25. Central Intelligence Agency, *Directory of Personalities of the Cuban Government, Official Organizations and Mass Organizations*, A73-12 (April 1973), pp. 829-843.

26. "From the Cutting Room Floor: The Complete Text of Barbara Walter's Interview with Fidel," *Seven Days*, December 1977, p. 211.

27. Leonel-Antonio de la Cuesta, "The Cuban Socialist Constitution: Its Originality and Role in Institutionalization," *Cuban Studies/Estudios Cubanos* 6: 18-19 (July 1976). Also see, *Constitution of the Republic of Cuba* (New York: Center for Cuban Studies, 1976).

28. Cuesta, *ibid.*, *Constitution*, *ibid.*

29. Interview with Elio Constantin, subdirector of *Granma*, Havana, Cuba, Nov. 17, 1977. Alisky, "Havana Havoc," loc. cit., documents the extent of the cor-

ruption in prerevolutionary Cuban journalism.

30. Ted Morgan, "The Press in Cuba," *Columbia Journalism Review*, March/April 1975, p. 14.

31. Thomas, *The Cuban Revolution*, op. cit., p. 691.

32. Volsky, "Cuba Propaganda," op. cit., p. 7; Andres Suarez, *Cuba: Castroism and Communism, 1959-1966* (Cambridge, Mass. The MIT Press, 1967), p. 202.

33. Donohue, Tichenor and Olien, "Gatekeeping," op. cit., p. 59.

34. The sources and methodology were similar to those used in previously published comparisons of the Cuban leadership. See Edward Gonzalez, "Institutionalization, Political Elites, and Foreign Policies," in Cole Blasier and Carmelo Mesa-Lago, eds., *Cuba in the World* (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1979) p. 3-36; Edward Gonzalez, "Political Succession in Cuba," in Irving Louis Horowitz, ed., *Cuban Communism* 3rd ed. (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1977), pp. 537-569; and William M. LeoGrande, "The Development of the Party System in Revolutionary Cuba," paper presented at the 1977 meeting of the Latin American Studies Association, Houston, November 1977.

35. LeoGrande, "Party System in Cuba," op. cit., p. 25.

36. Dominguez, *Cuba*, op. cit., p. 318.

37. Interview with Gail Reed, reporter for *Granma Weekly Review*, Havana, Cuba, April 14, 1979.

38. Interview with Mas Martin, loc. cit.

39. For studies on social control in Western newsrooms, see Donohue, et al., "Gatekeeping," loc. cit; Warren Breed, "Social Control in the News Room," in Wilbur Schramm, ed., *Mass Communications* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1960), pp. 178-194; Jeremy Tunstall, *Journalists at Work* (London: Constable, 1971); and Leon V. Sigal, *Reporters and Officials: The Organization and Politics of Newsmaking* (Lexington, Mass: D.C. Heath, 1973).

40. Black, et al., *Area Handbook*, op. cit., p. 324 and Blustein, et al., *Area Handbook*, op. cit., p. 275, passim.

41. L. Erwin Atwood and Gerald L. Grotta, "Socialization of News Values in Beginning Reporters," *Journalism Quarterly*, 50: 759-761 (Winter 1973); Jack M. McLeod and Ramona R. Rush, "Professionalization of Latin American and U.S. Journalists: Part II," *Journalism Quarterly*, 46: 784-789 (Winter 1969); and John Spicer Nichols, "Coyotes of the Press: Professionalization of Mexican Journalists," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Minnesota, 1978.

42. Dominguez, *Cuba*, op. cit., p. 396.

43. James W. Carty, Jr., "Communist ideology basic to J-education in Cuba," *Journalism Educator*, October 1978, p. 40.

44. Interviews with Lopez Pimentel and Juan Hernandez, director of Radio Liberacion, Havana, Cuba, April 14, 1979.

45. Dominguez, *Cuba*, op. cit., p. 303.

46. Interviews with Lopez Pimentel and Mas Martin, loc. cit.

47. Ernesto E. Rodriguez, "Public Opinion and the Press in Cuba," *Cuban Studies/Estudios Cubanos*, 8: 63 July 1978). *Granma's* propensity to publish more positive comments than negative ones indicates that Cuban editors, like their colleagues worldwide, are a bit thin-skinned about criticism of their media.

48. Interview with Hernandez, loc. cit.

49. Interview with Mas Martin, loc. cit.

50. Interview with Rodriguez, loc. cit.

51. Interview with Hernandez, loc. cit.

52. Ernesto Vera, "The Press and the Ideological Struggle in Cuba," *The Democratic Journalist*, 11-12, 1978, p. 22.
53. Ibid. and "15,000 'volunteer' journalists writing dull propaganda," *IPI Report*, March 1976, p. 12.
54. Interview with Rodriguez, loc. cit.
55. Fagen, "Mass Mobilization in Cuba," op. cit., p. 206.
56. Ibid., p. 205.
57. Mesa-Lago, *Cuba in the 1970s*, op. cit., p. ix.
58. Nelson P. Valdes, "Revolution and Institutionalization in Cuba," *Cuban Studies/Estudios Cubanos*, 6: 1-37 (Jan. 1976).
59. Gonzalez, "Institutionalization," op. cit., p. 5.
60. LeoGrande, "Party System in Cuba," loc. cit. For further discussion of the process of institutionalization, see "Cuba in the 1970s. Evaluating the Institutionalization of the Revolution," panel at the 8th national meeting of the Latin American Studies Association, Pittsburgh, PA, 5-7 April 1979. Individual papers presented during the panel were: Lourdes Casal, "Cuba: On the Political Organization of Socialist Democracy;" Max Azicri, "The Institutionalization of the Cuban State: A Political Perspective;" William LeoGrande, "Arms and Politics: New Trends in Cuban Civil-Military Relations;" and Francisco Martinez Soler, "Cuba's Strategies for Economic Development."
61. Gail Reed, "April 8: election day in Cuba," *Granma Weekly Review*, April 15, 1979, p. 4.
62. Archibald R.M. Ritter, "The Cuban Revolution: A New Orientation," *Current History*, February 1978, p. 87.
63. Ibid., p. 84.
64. F. Castro, "Discurso en conmemoracion del XVII aniversario del asalto al cuartel Moncada," *Granma Resumen Semanal*, Aug. 2, 1970, pp. 2-6.
65. Rodriguez, "Public Opinion in Cuba," op. cit., p. 55.
66. Lionel Martin, "Paper's 'Consumer Action' Column Blows the Whistle on Abuses in Cuba," *Washington Post*, Nov. 4, 1977, p. A27.
67. Interview with Gail Reed, loc. cit.
68. Martin, " 'Consumer Action' Column," loc. cit.
69. Dominguez, *Cuba*, op. cit., pp. 415-416.
70. Ritter, "Cuban Revolution," op. cit., p. 56.
71. Gonzalez, "Institutionalization," op. cit., p. 11.
72. Ibid., p. 5.
73. Dominguez, *Cuba*, op. cit., p. 415.
74. John Spicer Nichols, "The Mass Media: Their Functions in Social Conflict," in Jorge I. Dominguez, ed., *Cuba: Internal and International Affairs* (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, Inc., forthcoming).
75. Interviews with Mendoza and Lopez, loc. cit.
76. Lee Lockwood, *Castro's Cuba, Cuba's Fidel* (New York: Random House, 1969), p. 129.

APPENDIX
Cuban Media Policy Makers

Name	Media Position	Communist Party of Cuba (PCC)	Government of National Assembly	Mass Organizations/ Other	Pre-1959 Affiliations
I. Government of the National Assembly of the People's Power					
Guelmes, Pedro (Gonzales)	minister of communications ¹	member, central committee	former chief, communications directorate, MINFAR; major in army		M26-7
Hernandez, Rene (Cartaya)	First vice minister of communications (in charge of radio)				
Herrera, Nivaldo (Capote)	President, Cuban Institute of Radio and Television (ICRT)	former asst. sec., DOR		vice president, Cuban-Arab Friendship Assn., ICAP	
Infante, Reinaldo	VP, Planning, ICRT				
Yepe, Manuel (Menendez)	VP, Radio, ICRT	former official, DOR	former ambassador to Rumania	former director Prensa Latina	M26-7
Diaz, Roberto (Munoz)	VP, ICRT				
Molto, Antonio	VP, ICRT			member, national directorate UPEC	

Zamora, Conrado	VP, ICRT			
Rodriguez, Leslie Rodrigo (Aguilera)	director, Directorate for Television, ICRT ¹		held numerous other positions within ICRT	
Valdes, Pastor (Sanchez)	director, Directorate for Radio, ICRT		former director, Radio Reloj	
Vinas, Alfredo (Alonso)	director, Radio Havana, ICRT		former asst. director, <i>Granma</i>	
Mas, Luis (Martin)	director, Radio Rebelde, ICRT		VP, Cuban-Chinese Friendship Assn. ICAP	PSP
Hernandez, Juan	director, Radio Liberacion, ICRT			
Perez, Leoncio (Linares)	director, Radio Progreso, ICRT			
?	director, Radio Reloj, ICRT			
Hart, Armando Enrique (Davalos)	Minister of Culture	member, politburo; member, central committee	Member, Council of State; deputy, national assembly; former minister of education	numerous other government posts M26-7
Nunez, Antonio (Jimenez)	vice minister of culture (international relations)		deputy, national assembly; former ambassador to Peru	president, National Monument Com; former president, Cuban-Soviet Friendship Assn., ICAP

Almeida, Rafael (Alemany)	vice minister of culture (literature, arts)	former Rector, Oriente Univer- sity	former secretary of National Committee, UJC	
Guevara, Alfredo (Valdes)	vice minister of culture (film)	deputy, national assembly; presi- dent, Cuban- British Parlia- mentary Group	former president, ICAIC	PSP
Rodriguez, Rolando (Garcia)	vice minister of culture (books)		director, Cuban Book Institute ²	
Garcia, Julio Pedio (Espinosa)	director, Cuban Institute of Cinema- tographic Art and Industry		chair, technical advisory committee, ministry of culture	PSP
Alvarez, Santiago (Roman)	deputy director ICAIC	deputy, national assembly; VP, Cuban-Japanese Friendship Parlia- mentary Group	chairman, National Committee for Imple- mentation of Evaluation for the Artistic Sector	PSP
Otero, Lisandro (Gonzalez)	director, Directorate for Press, Information and Culture, MINREX ²	government spokes- man; cultural attache to Chile, MINREX	director, <i>Cuba</i> magazine ² ; M26-7 member, editorial board, <i>Casa de las Americas</i> ; prominent novelist	
Yassells, Eduardo (Ferrer)	director, <i>Verde Olivo</i> magazine, MINFAR	Lt. Col. in MINFAR; former dir- ector of School of Journalism, Western (Havana) University	secretary of publica- tions, national direc- torate, UPEC	

Gutierrez, Rosendo
(Roman) deputy director,
Verde Olivo, MINFAR

Rodriguez, Miriam
(Betancourt) dean, School of Jour-
nalism, University of
Havana, MINED

Major, MINFAR

chairman, military
press section, UPEC

wrote text on
Journalism

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II. Communist Party of Cuba (PCC)

Mendoza, Jorge
Enrique (Reboredo)

director, *Granma*
newspaper, PCC

member, cen-
tral com-
mittee

deputy, national
assembly; former
subdirector, MINED

former director,
El Mundo

M26-7

Guerra, Angel
(Cabrera)

director, *Bohemia*
magazine, PCC

official, edu-
cation, science
& culture Dept.

former member national
Comt., UJC; former
director, *Juventud*
Rebelde

Fundora, Orlando
(Lopez)

chief, Dept.
Revolutionary
Orientation, PCC

M26-7

Aldana, Carlos
(Escalante)

deputy chief,
DOR, PCC

capt. MINFAR;
former chief of
Information, Poli-
tical Directo-
rate, MINFAR

Domenech, Oscar
(Guell)

deputy chief,
DOR, PCC

held numerous positions
in Centennial Youth
Column and UJC

III. Mass Organizations

Lopez, Jorge
(Pimental)

director, *Juventud*
Rebelde, UJC

member, national
committee, UJC

Ortez, Jose M.
(Garcia)

director, *Trabajadores*
Central Union of
Cuban Workers

former chief
of Infor-
mation, DOR

former director general,
Prensa Latina; former
deputy director, *Granma*.

Vera, Ernesto
(Medel)

president, national
directorate, UPEC

Cuban rep. to & VP of
International Organiza-
tion of Journalists
(Prague); leader, Latin
American Federation of
Journalists; member World
Peace Council (Soviet
sponsored); president,
Cuban-Spanish Friendship
Assn., ICAP; VP, Cuban-
Soviet Friendship Assn.
ICAP

M26-7

Carneado, Jose
Felipe (Rodriguez)

VP, national direc-
torate, UPEC ¹

member, central
committee; ch-
ief, education,
culture and sc-
ience Dept. of
Central Comt.;
former official,
DOR

chief, office
for religious
affairs, mini-
ster of Inter-
ior

former VP of International
Organization of Journalists;
former director, *Prensa Latina*

PSP

Guillen, Nicolas
(Batista)

president, nat-
ional directorate,
UNEAC

member,
central
committee

deputy, national
assembly; chair,
Permanent Working
Committee of Arts
and Culture

president, Cuban-Mongol
Friendship Assn., ICAP;
director, *La Gaceta de*
Cuba (journal of UNEAC);
national poet

PSP

Suardiaz, Luis
(Rivero)

first VP, UNEAC

Augier, Angel
(Proenza)

VP, UNEAC

council member,
center for Marti
Studies, Min. of
Culture

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IV. Semi-autonomous Organizations

Robreno, Gustavo
(Dolz)

director, Prensa
Latina (PL)

former first sec &
Charge d'Affairs,
Cuban embassy in
Democratic Rep of
Vietnam; former
attache, Cuban
embassy, Indonesia;
foreign service
officer, MINREX

VP, Cuban-Arab Friend-
ship Assn. ICAP

Mora, Carlos
(Hernan)

deputy director,
PL

former press
attache, Cuban
embassies in
Mexico, Chile

former PL correspondent
in Spain

Martinez, Aurelio
(Villalta)

director, *Cuba
International*, PL

Hernandez, Julio
(Blanco)

deputy dir., *Cuba
International*, PL

former PL correspondent
in France, Algeria

Santamaria,
Haydee (Cuadrado)

director, *Casa de las
Americas*

member,
central
committee

member, council
of state; deputy,
national assembly

formerly married to Hart,
Minister of Culture; holds
numerous positions on
delegations and committees

M26-7

Rodriguez, Mariano
(Alvarez)

deputy dir., *Casa
de las Americas*

Cuban delegate to
inauguration of Salvador
Allende of Chile

Fernandez, Roberto
(Retamar)

director, *Casa de
las Americas* magazine

director, center
for Marti Stu-
dies, Min. Cul-
ture; professor,
U of Havana, MINED

VP, Cuban-Soviet Friendship
Assn. ICAP

(1) Although the Ministry of Communications deals primarily with the physical means of communications including transportation, postal service, telephone, etc., the minister and the first vice minister have some supervisory responsibilities for broadcasting including, to some extent, program content.

(2) It is uncertain if the media policy-maker still holds this position. Either there is an indication that the policy-maker has taken another position without notice of his resignation from this position or the source citing this position is dated. Therefore, these data should be used with caution.

Abbreviations: DOR — Department of Revolutionary Orientation, PCC; ICAIC — Cuban Institute of Cinematographic Art and Industry; ICAP — Cuban Institute of Friendship with the Peoples; ICRT — Cuban Institute of Radio and Television; M26-7 — July 26th Movement (Castro's guerrilla army); MINED — Ministry of Education; MINFAR — Ministry of Revolutionary Armed Forces; MINREX — Ministry of Foreign Relations; PCC — Communist Party of Cuba; PL — Prensa Latina news agency; PSP — Popular Socialist Party (prerevolutionary communists); UJC — Union of Young Communists; UNEAC — National Union of Cuban Writers and Artists; and UPEC — Union of Cuban Journalists.

Sources: Central Intelligence Agency, National Foreign Assessment Center, *Directory of Cuban Officials*, CR79-10002 (January 1979); Central Intelligence Agency, National Foreign Assessment Center, *Directory of Cuban Government and Mass Organizations*, CR78-11938 (June 1978); Central Intelligence Agency, *Directory of Personalities of the Cuban Government, Official Organizations, and Mass Organizations*, A73-12 (April 1973); Jan Knippers Black, et al., *Area Handbook for Cuba*, DA PAM 550-152 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976); Howard I. Blutstein, et al., *Area Handbook for Cuba*, DA PAM 550-152 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1971); Hugh Thomas, *The Cuban Revolution* (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1977); James W. Carty, Jr., *Cuban Communications* (Bethany, W.Va: Bethany College, 1978); and personal interviews in Havana, November 1977 and April 1979.